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Abstract—This paper presents a multi-stage approach to the
placement of charging stations under the scenarios of different
electric vehicle (EV) penetration rates. The EV charging market
is modeled as the oligopoly. A consumer behavior based approach
is applied to forecast the charging demand of the charging
stations using a nested logit model. The impacts of both the urban
road network and the power grid network on charging station
planning are also considered. At each planning stage, the optimal
station placement strategy is derived through solving a Bayesian
game among the service providers. To investigate the interplay of
the travel pattern, the consumer behavior, urban road network,
power grid network, and the charging station placement, a
simulation platform (The EV Virtual City 1.0) is developed using
Java on Repast. We conduct a case study in the San Pedro District
of Los Angeles by importing the geographic and demographic
data of that region into the platform. The simulation results
demonstrate a strong consistency between the charging station
placement and the traffic flow of EVs. The results also reveal an
interesting phenomenon that service providers prefer clustering
instead of spatial separation in this oligopoly market.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in EV technology are leading us into an
era of large-scale vehicle electrification. However, the sparsity
of current public charging infrastructure remains as a major
impediment to the proliferation of EVs. Our work aims to
develop guidelines for the charging service providers to make
a foresightful decision on charging station placement so they
have a good chance to make profits.
In our work, multiple charging service providers try to
maximize their own overall utility while satisfying the Quality-
of-Service (QoS) constraints when choosing the optimal char-
ging station placement. Our approach is based on a multi-
stage planning strategy, where the service providers need to
forecast the charging demand at a charging station candidate
at each planning stage. Characterizing the charging demand
also requires consumer behavior analysis to reflect the various
consumer preferences. To this end, we employ the nested
logit model to analyse the charging behavior of EV owners.
Then, we derive the optimal placement strategy by solving
a Bayesian game among the service providers. Finally, we
develop a simulation platform using Java on Repast [1], and
conduct a case study in the San Pedro District of Los Angeles.
There is an increasing literature aimed at addressing the is-
sue of EV charging infrastructure deployment. [2]-[5] have for-
mulated charging station placement as an optimization prob-
lem. However, the objective functions in those optimization
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problems did not consider the consumer’s overall satisfaction
(utility) in terms of charging price, cost of travel to the station,
and amenities available near the charging station (restaurant,
supermarket, etc.) Furthermore, the optimization framework
was constructed from the perspective of a central planner
instead of providers in a deregulated market. Bernardo et al.
[6] employed a discrete choice model (DCM) to investigate
the optimal locations for fast charging stations. They modeled
each potential EV charging station as a player in the game.
However, their formulation assumed that each player has the
complete information about the other players. This assumption
may be too strict and implausible in a realistic market. In
our work, the Bayesian game is posed with an information
structure that supposes incomplete information among players.
The main contributions of our work are as follows: (1)
A multi-stage charging station deployment framework with
different EV penetration rates is presented; (2) A nested logit
model is employed to analyze the consumer’s satisfaction and
forecast the charging demand, which provides us insights into
the behavioral process of EV owners’ charging decisions;
(3) An oligopolistic market model of EV charging service
providers and EV owners is studied using a Bayesian game
among multiple charing service providers; (4) A Java simula-
tion platform (The EV Virtual City 1.0) has been developed to
analyze the interplay of travel patterns of EV owners, charging
demand, urban infrastructure and charging station placement
strategies.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the special case of three service providers
which offer three EV charging services [8], namely, Level
1, Level 2, and Level 3 (see Table I). This setting can
be easily generalized to more service providers. Specifically,
we assume that service provider 1 offers Level 1 charging
service, service provider 2 offers Level 2 charging service,
and service provider 3 offers Level 3 charging service. Each
service provider can, however, own multiple charging stations.
At each planning stage, the three service providers choose
some locations from a given set of candidate locations, denoted
as I = {1, 2, 3 · · · , L}, to place the charging stations. Let
E = {1, 2, 3, · · · , N} index the EVs.
A. The Profit of Charging Service Provider
We assume that charging stations affiliated with the same
service provider have the same retail price. Each charging
station purchases the electricity from the wholesale market
at the locational marginal price (LMP). In a deregulated
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Table I
CHARGE METHOD ELECTRICAL RATINGS
Charging Method Nominal Supply Voltage(Volts) Maximum Current (Amps) Time from fully depleted to fully charged
Level 1 120 vac, 1-phase 12 A 16-18 hours
Level 2 208 to 240 vac, 1-phase 32 A 3-8 hours
Level 3 600 vdc maximum 400 A maximum less than 30 minutes
electricity markets, LMP is calculated for every node by
market coordinator [9]. Let pk represent the retail price of
provider k (k = 1, 2, 3), and cj,k represent the LMP of the
jth charging station candidate of service provider k. Let p−k
denote the retail prices of the other two service providers
except k, and ψj,k denote the expected charging demand of the
jth charging station candidate of service provider k. Define
Sk = [s1,k, s2,k, · · · , sL,k]T as the placement decision of
service provider k, where sj,k ∈ {0, 1} is a binary variable
with sj,k = 1 indicating service provider k will place a
charging station at the jth candidate location, and sj,k = 0
otherwise. Let S−k represent the placement decisions of the
other two service providers except k. Define θj,k as the setup
cost of the jth charging station candidate. Define Πk as the
total profit of service provider k.
Πk = pkΨ
T
kSk − diag[Ck]ΨTkSk −ΘTkSk, (1)
and define
Rk = pkΨ
T
kSk − diag[Ck]ΨTkSk, (2)
where Ψk = [ψ1,k, ψ2,k, ψ3,k, · · · , ψL,k]T, and Ck =
[c1,k, c2,k, · · · , cL,k]T and Θk = [θ1,k, θ2,k, · · · , θL,k]T. diag[.]
is an operator to create a diagonal matrix using the underlying
vector. [.]T is the transpose operation. pkΨTkSk is the total
sales, diag[Ck]ΨTkSk is the cost of purchasing electricity, and
ΘTkSk accounts for the setup cost. Rk is the total revenue of
service provider k.
B. The Impact of EV Charging on Power Grid
Large-scale EV integration will present many challenges on
the power grid, e.g. system stability, power loss, frequency
regulation, etc [10]-[12]. For the power grid, the generators
will collaboratively adjust the output of real power and re-
active power to maintain system stability, perform frequency
regulation or voltage regulation. The 2-norm deviation of
generating power (real power and reactive power) is widely
used as a metric to evaluate the difficulty in mitigating the
“disturbance” of the power grid caused by external factors.
In our case, the 2-norm difference between the generating
power with and without EV charging is used as a metric to
characterize the impacts of EV charging on the electric power
system. Assuming that the power system has M generators
and D buses (substations), we define the disturbance as
B =
∥∥P baseg − P EVg ∥∥22 + ∥∥Qbaseg −QEVg ∥∥22 , (3)
where P baseg is a M × 1 vector representing the real power
generated by the M generators under base power load scenario
(without EV charging), and P EVg is the vector of real power
under the EV charging scenario (with EV charging). Similarly,
QEVg and Q
base
g are the vectors of reactive power with and
without EV charging, respectively.
C. Quality-of-Service Constraints
We propose two quality-of-service (QoS) metrics: (1) aver-
age service delay probability Υk, (k = 1, 2, 3), (2) average
service coverage Ξk, (k = 1, 2, 3).
Υk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
υi,k Ξk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi,k, (4)
where υi,k is the average service delay probability of the ith
EV owner with respect to service provider k. ξi,k is the average
number of accessible Level k charging stations when the ith
EV owner travels around.
D. Multi-stage Charging Station Planning Scheme
We define the utility function of service provider as follows:
Uk = Πk − wBk, (5)
where w is a weight coefficient. The first term is the total
profits made from EV charging, and the second term charac-
terizes the penalty of power grid from large-scale EV charging.
At each new stage, the service providers obtain the optimal
placement strategy by solving the following problem.
[STk |ST−11 , ST−12 , ST−13 ] =
argmax
s1,k,··· ,sL,k
sj,k∈{0,1}
{
ES−k [Uk]|ST−11 , ST−12 , ST−13
}
, (6)
subject to
Υk ≤ Υ0, Ξk ≤ Ξ0, (7)
where ES−k [.] is the expectation over S−k. STk accounts for
the placement decision at stage T .
To solve this problem, we need to answer two principal
questions: (1) How to forecast the charging demand at each
charging station candidate? (2) How to calculate the optimal
placement strategy in a more effective way? In Section III,
we apply the nested logit model to estimate the charging
demand. In Section IV, we employ a Bayesian game model
to characterize the strategic interaction among the service
providers and derive the placement strategies.
III. CHARGING DEMAND OF EV CHARGING STATION
The charging demand at a charging station candidate is
defined as the sum of the product of the probability that
EV owners will go to that charging station and the energy
needed to charge the EVs. Many factors may influence the
charging behaviors, such as the retail charging price, travel
distances, amenities available near the charging station, the
travel purpose of EV owners, etc. In our work, we apply
the nested logit model to characterize the attractiveness of
a charging station and analyze the charging behavior of EV
owners [13].
A. Nested Logit Model And Probability of Choice
The nested logit model belongs to the family of discrete
choice model (DCM), which is widely utilized in the analysis
and forecast of a consumer’s decision among a finite set of
choice alternatives [13]. The main idea of DCM is that a
consumer tries to maximize the total utility when making a
decision on choosing from multiple choice alternatives.
In our problem, there are three service providers offering
Level 1 charging, Level 2 charging and Level 3 charging.
Each provider operates multiple charging stations. The utility
that the nth EV owner can obtain from choosing charging
station j (j = 1, 2, · · · , L) of service provider k (k =
1, 2, 3) is denoted as Unj,k = U
n
j,k + 
n
j,k, where U
n
j,k cor-
responds to the observable utility and nj,k corresponds to
the unobservable utility. The vector of unobservable utility
n = [n1,1, · · · , nL,1, n1,2, · · · , nL,2, n1,3, · · · , nL,3]T has a gen-
eralized extreme value (GEV) distribution with cumulative
distribution function given by
F (n) = exp
(
−
3∑
k=1
(
L∑
l=1
e−
n
l,k/σk
)σk)
, (8)
where σk is a measure of the degree of independence in the
unobservable utility among the charging stations owned by
service provider k.
For nested logit model, we can decompose the observable
utility U
n
j,k into two components: the utility of choosing a
service provider (i.e. charging level) and the utility of choosing
a charging station. In addition, we assume home charging acts
as the “outside good” in the market [14]-[15]. Hence, U
n
j,k for
EV owner n can be expressed as
U
n
j,k = W
n
k + V
n
j,k, (9)
where W
n
k corresponds to the observable utility of choosing
service provider k (choosing nest k), and V
n
j,k accounts for
the observable utility of choosing charging station j given that
service provider k has been chosen. W
n
k and V j,k are linear
weighted combinations of characteristics of both the charging
stations and the EV owner.
W
n
k = γk,1y
n
1 + γk,2y
n
2 , (10)
where yn1 and y
n
2 represent, respectively, the travel purpose and
income of EV owner n, and γk,1, γk,2 are the corresponding
weight coefficients. As an “outside good” in the market, the
utility of home charging is normalized, i.e. W
n
0 = 0.
V
n
j,k =αkpk + µkd
n
j,k + ηkz
n
j,k+
λk,1xj,k,1 + λk,2xj,k,2 + λk,3xj,k,3,
(11)
where pk is the retail charging price and znj,k is the des-
tination indicator. If the jth charging station is near the
EV owner’s travel destination (within a threshold distance
dth), znj,k = 1, otherwise, z
n
j,k = 0. d
n
j,k is the deviating
distance due to EV charging. Additionally, each candidate
charging station is associated with a set of characteristics
Xj,k = [xj,k,1, xj,k,2, xj,k,3]
T, which characterizes the attract-
iveness of this charging station in terms of three amenities.
For instance, if there exists a restaurant near location j, we
set xj,k,1 = 1, otherwise xj,k,1 = 0. Similarly, xj,k,2 and
xj,k,3 are the indicators for shopping center and supermarket,
respectively. αk, µk, ηk, λk,1, λk,2, λk,2 are weighting coeffi-
cients.
The EV owner’s choice is not deterministic due to the
random unobservable utility. However, we can derive the
probability that he/she will choose a certain charging station by
taking the expectation over the unobservable utilities defined
in Equation (8). The probability that the nth EV owner will
choose the jth charging station of service provider k is [13]
Φnj,k = Prob
(
U
n
j,k + 
n
j,k > U
n
i,l + 
n
i,l,∀i 6= j, or l 6= k
)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
Fj,k(U
n
j,k − U
n
1,1 + 
n
j,k, U
n
j,k − U
n
2,1 + 
n
j,k,
· · · , nj,k, · · · , U
n
j,k − U
n
L,3 + 
n
j,k)d
n
j,k
(12)
where Fj,k denotes the derivative of F with respect to nj,k,
i.e. Fj,k = ∂F/∂nj,k. Finally, we obtain
Φnj,k =
eU
n
j,k/σk
(∑L
l=1 e
U
n
l,k/σk
)σk−1
∑3
t=1
(∑L
l=1 e
U
n
l,t/σt
)σt . (13)
Once the EV owners’ choice probability is calculated, one
can estimate the charging demand of a charging station. Let
qn (n = 1, 2, · · · , N) denote the total energy (measured in
kWh) EV owner n plans to purchase to charge the vehicle,
and assume that qn is a random variable uniformly distributed
in the range [0.5Q,Q], where Q denotes the battery capacity
of EVs. To simplify the analysis, further assume that all EVs
have the same battery capacity. The total charging demand for
charging station j of service provider k is given by
ψj,k =
N∑
n=1
qnΦ
n
j,k. (14)
All the weight parameters in the nested logit model can
be estimated using the data from stated and revealed pref-
erence survey. The key component of nested logit model is
to calculate the probabilities that an EV owner will go to the
given charging stations. However, it does not necessarily imply
that each time an EV owner will always decide on which
charging station according to the probabilities. An individual
EV owner may still go to a fixed charging station regularly.
The charging demand calculation is statistically meaningful
only when we sum up the individual charging demand over a
substantial number of EVs.
IV. OPTIMAL PLACEMENT IN A BAYESIAN GAME
In practice, a service provider usually does not know the
exact setup costs and payoff functions of the other two
providers, so we pose the problem as a Bayesian game [17]
among the service providers at each stage of charging station
planning. In this game, a player corresponds to a service
provider.
For simplicity, we drop the stage index in the following
definitions since the Bayesian game has the same scheme at
each stage. A Bayesian game consists of a set of players
I, a strategy space Sk, a type space Θk, a payoff function
uk and the joint probability of the types f(Θ1,Θ2,Θ3).
Sk = [s1,k, s2,k, · · · , sL,k]T corresponds to all possible place-
ment strategies for player k. S−k corresponds to the place-
ment strategies of the other players except player k. We
define f(S−k) as probability mass function (PMF) of the
placement strategies of the other players. The type space
Θk = [θ1,k, θ2,k, · · · , θL,k]T represents the setup costs of all
charging station candidates of service provider k. In this paper,
we assume that a service provider knows its own type, but not
the exact types of the other two service providers.
Denote θj,k as the setup cost for charging station j of service
provider k, which includes the equipment cost, installation
fee, construction cost, land rental, etc. θj,k has i.i.d. uniform
distribution.
Before proceeding to solve the Bayesian game, we make
the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: f(S−k) is binomially distributed with
parameter 0.5, i.e. S−k v Binomial(2L, 0.5).
Remark 1: The distribution of S−k reflects how player
k conjectures that the other players will behave in the game.
Since the geographic and demographic information is common
knowledge known to all players, each player will form their
conjectures about the other players according to their beliefs
about the competitors. For simulation simplicity, we assume
S−k has a binomial distribution with parameter 0.5. However,
the theoretical analysis applies to any other distributions of
S−k.
Assumption 2: All service providers in the market are
Bertrand competitors.
Remark 2: Bertrand competitors are players do not co-
operate with each other. Their goal is to maximize their own
utility by choosing the optimal charging station placement.
For each player, the Bayesian Nash Equilibirum (BNE) of
entry actions must satisfy the best response of Equation (6).
To solve Equation (6), we need to know the retail charging
prices of all the service providers. Due to Bertrand compet-
ition among the service providers, the retail prices for every
combination of the charging station placements are determined
by the first order of conditions (FOC):
∂Π1
∂p1
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnΦ
n
j,1sj,1+
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
(p1−cj,1)qn
∂Φnj,1
∂p1
sj,1 = 0
(15)
∂Π2
∂p2
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnΦ
n
j,2sj,2+
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
(p2−cj,2)qn
∂Φnj,2
∂p2
sj,2 = 0
(16)
∂Π3
∂p3
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnΦ
n
j,3sj,3+
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
(p3−cj,3)qn
∂Φnj,3
∂p3
sj,3 = 0
(17)
where cj,1, cj,2, and cj,3 represent the LMP at each charging
station candidate.
Remark 3: The retail prices calculated from Equations
(15)-(17) may not be the real-time prices used in practice. They
Figure 1. The Screenshot of Simulation Platform
are the equilibrium prices in this market under the assumption
of Bertrand competition and simultaneous move game. They
can be interpreted as the averaged charging prices of the
service providers over a long period of time. In reality, the
service providers take turns to set the retail price in respond
to the prices of the competitors. It may takes a long time before
the providers to reach the equilibrium prices. In addition, if
the other factors changes (i.e. consumer’s preference, crude
oil price soaring, etc.), the previous equilibrium does not hold
and new equilibrium can be calculated in a similar manner as
above.
Theorem 1 [Strategy Decision Condition]: Under the As-
sumption 1 and Assumption 2, service provider k will choose
placement strategy l(l = 1, 2, 3, · · · , 2L) if the type space Θk
falls into the hypervolume specified by
H(l) =
{Θk ∈ RL+ : ΘTk (Sk,j − Sk,l)− (ERk,j − ERk,l)
+ w(Bk,j −Bk,l) > 0;∀j 6= l},
(18)
where Sk,j and Sk,l denote the placement strategy j and l,
respectively. ERk,j and ERk,l denote the total revenue with
deployment strategy j and l, respectively.
Proof. Each service provider has L candidate locations,
so there are 2L different placement strategies. We treat
the type space as an L-dimensional space, and Θk =
[θ1,k, θ2,k, · · · , θL,k]T represents a point in this space.
By Equation (6), strategy l is optimal if
E[Rk,l]−ΘTkSk,l − wBk,l > E[Rk,j ]−
ΘTkSk,j − wBk,j ; (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2L, j 6= l).
(19)
Rearranging the terms, we get
ΘTk (Sk,j − Sk,l)− (ERk,j − ERk,l)+
w(Bk,j −Bk,l) > 0; (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2L, j 6= l),
(20)
V. SIMULATION PLATFORM AND CASE STUDY
In this study, we have developed a general-purpose simula-
tion platform (The EV Virtual City 1.0) using Repast [1]. We
conduct a case study on the San Pedro District of Los Angeles
using the simulation platform. See Fig. 1 for a screenshot of
the simulation platform. See Fig.2(a) for the map of San Pedro
District of Los Angeles.
(a) Roads and Buildings of San Pedro District (b) The IEEE 118-bus System
Figure 2. Maps of San Pedro District
(a) A Snapshot of EVs Movement (b) The Optimal Charging Station Locations of Three Service Providers
Figure 3. Simulation Results
From the California Energy Commission website, we obtain
the information of transmission line and substations in San
Pedro District. This region has 107 substations in total. We
use the IEEE 118-bus power system test case in our simulation
with only 107 buses (substations) and 54 generators. See
Fig.2(b). The base power load is calculated using the estimated
residential power load in this area. For each charging station
placement, we use MATPOWER to calculate the LMP of each
charging station and the generating power with and without
EV charging [18].
In the simulations, we consider three levels of EV pen-
etration with 5000 EVs, 10000 EVs, and 15000 EVs. The
corresponding EV penetration rates are 0.32%, 0.64%, and
0.96%, respectively. From the 2009 National Household Travel
Survey (2009 NHTS) [19], we calculate the distribution of
travel pattern of household: (1) 27.20% for Home-Workplace
pattern, (2) 10.90% for Home-Shopping Center pattern, (3)
18.70% for Home-Supermarket pattern, (4) 13.10% for Home-
Restaurant (cafe, bar) pattern, (5) 30.10% for Home-Other
pattern. We model Fj,k as i.i.d. uniform distribution in the
simulations.
A snapshot of the movement of EV owners is shown in
Fig. 3(a). Each red star represents an EV owner (agent). The
heatmap of EV owners is also plotted in this figure. The
simulation results are summarized in Table II. In Fig. 3(b),
the blue square, red square, and green square represent the
Level 1 charging station, Level 2 charging station, and Level
3 charging station, respectively. The number in the square
indicates that at which stage this charging station is set up.
From Fig. 3 we can make four observations:
• The optimal charging station deployment is highly con-
sistent with the heatmap of EV owners movement, which
demonstrates that our model can adequately capture the
mobility of EV owners.
• As for the number of charging stations, Level 1 charging
station is predominant over Level 2 and Level 3, probably
because it takes a longer time for Level 1 to finish char-
ging. Hence, Level 1 service provider must place more
charging stations to satisfy the average delay probability
constraint. On the other hand, the difference in quantity
also indicates that the marketing strategies for the three
service providers are different. Service provider 1 tries
to place the charging stations widely across the entire
area, while service provider 3 is more likely to place the
charging stations at some “hot” locations.
• The number of charging stations does not grow linearly
with the number of EVs. Their relationship seems to
follow a convex curve. At stage 1 (initial stage), service
providers place more charging stations. When the number
of EVs doubles or triples (compared to the initial stage),
Table II
CHARGING STATION PLACEMENT STRATEGY
Stage Level Delay prob. Coverage Newly Built Stations Total # of Stations
Stage 1 Level 1 0.281 2.18 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 14
(Penetration Rate 0.32%, Level 2 0.174 1.59 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 9
5000 EVs) Level 3 0.024 1.11 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 13 6
Stage 2 Level 1 0.292 3.00 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24 20
(Penetration Rate 0.64%, Level 2 0.196 2.11 18, 20, 23, 24 13
10000 EVs) Level 3 0.064 1.44 23, 25 8
Stage 3 Level 1 0.289 3.851 16, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 28
(Penetration Rate 0.96%, Level 2 0.195 3.145 16, 19, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30 21
15000 EVs) Level 3 0.083 2.081 16, 19, 21, 30 12
service providers can just add less charging stations to
satisfy the constraints. One explanation is that the high
delay probability at certain busy charging stations force
EV owners to choose the other idle charging stations.
In other words, the charging behavior and the temporal-
spatial charging demand is reshaped due to the uneven
delay probability among those charging stations.
• Service providers prefer agglomeration instead of spatial
separation. The three service providers have segmented
the market by offering three distinctive products (charging
services) in terms of voltage, current, charging time
and charging price. Through product differentiation, they
significantly soften the price competition so that they
do not need to spatially separate from each other to
further relax competition. This observation supports the
conclusion in [20]-[22] that firms do not have to maxim-
ize differentiation in every characteristic of the product.
Instead, differentiation in one dominant characteristic is
sufficient to alleviate price competition.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a multi-stage consumer
behavior based approach to solving the problem of EV char-
ging station placement. The nested logit model is utilized to
analyze the charging behavior of EV owners. We use the
Bayesian game to characterize the competition among the ser-
vice providers, and by solving the game we obtain the optimal
placement strategies for the service providers. In addition, we
develop a simulation platform called “The EV Virtual City
1.0” using Java, and conduct a case study of San Pedro District
of Los Angeles on this platform. The simulation results show
that the charging station placement is highly consistent with
the traffic flow of EVs. The observations from the simulation
may serve as a guideline for the local community to effectively
promote and manage the EV charging market.
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